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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the trial court commit reversible error in refusing
to admit evidence of the respondent's post-accident flight under
the facts of the instant case?
Did the trial court commit reversible error in relation
to the opinion testimony of appellant's expert, Val Shupe?
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Utah Rules of Evidence, 103, 401, 402, and 403, and 705
will determine the outcome of this appeal.

Due to the length of

these provisions, the text of each is set out in Appendix A of
this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant Fisher and respondent Trapp were involved in
an auto-pedestrian accident in Salt Lake City on June 3, 1982, at
approximately 9:15 p.m.

Fisher brought action against Trapp

alleging that the accident was the result of Trapp's negligent
driving.

The case was tried before a jury.

The jury returned a

verdict of "no cause of action" in favor of Trapp.
During an in-camera hearing before trial, Trapp
acknowledged that he had failed to stop at the scene of the accident.

Following the collision, Trapp continued northbound on

Redwood Road in Salt Lake City for some distance.
turned around and returned to the accident site.

Trapp then
Upon returning

to the scene, Trapp observed an adult rendering aid and assistance
to Fisher.
Trapp left the scene a second time only to return again.
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Upon his return, Trapp spoke with a police officer, but did not
immediately identify himself as the driver of the car. After
speaking with the officer, Trapp drove home.
Within 30 minutes of the accident, Trapp telephoned the
police and identified himself as the driver of the car.

(Record

at 270)
Before trial Trapp made a motion in limine to exclude
evidence that he failed to stop at the scene of the collision.
(Record at 271) At the hearing on the motion, Fisher denied that
his injuries were aggravated in any way by Trapp1s failure to
stop.

(Record at 272)

Rather, Fisher contended that such evi-

dence was admissible to create an inference of consciousness of
guilt.

(Record at 272)

exclude the evidence.

The trial court granted Trapp1s motion to

The trial judge ruled that the prejudicial

effect of the evidence outweighed any probative value the evidence
of flight might have.

(Record at 273)

At trial, both Trapp and Patrick Fisher, appellant's
12-year old brother, testified how the accident occurred.
(Record at 282-286 and 309-318) Appellant was unable to testify
since he has no conscious recollection of the accident.
at 303)

(Record

The investigating officer and experts for both parties

testified on the circumstances and cause of the accident.
(Record at 368, 69, 392 and 427)
The following facts surrounding the collision were
established without serious dispute at trial:
1.

At approximately 9:15 p.m. on June 3, 1982, Trapp
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was driving north in the east lane of Redwood Road near 400 North
in Salt Lake City.
2.

(Record at 282)

The evening was dark and the headlights on Trapp1s

vehicle were lighted on low beam.
heavy.

Traffic on the highway was

(Record at 282)
3.

Just prior to the collision, Trapp1s automobile was

traveling at approximately 38 to 40 miles per hour in a 45 mile
per hour traffic zone.
4.

(Record at 283, 298, 315 and 366)

As Trapp neared 430 North on Redwood Road, Fisher

and his-brother Patrick were standing along the west shoulder of
Redwood Road, waiting for traffic to clear so they could cross
the street.
5.

(Record at 309-310)
As Fisher darted across the west lane of Redwood

Road, his brother saw the Trapp vehicle and yelled to Fisher.
(Record at 310, 315)
6.

Fisher was nine years old at the time of his acci-

dent with Trapp.
7.

(Record at 303)

There was no crosswalk at the point where Fisher

attempted to cross Redwood Road.
8.

(Record at 306, 367)

Fisher collided with the left front fender of the

Trapp vehicle and fell backwards or "kind of sideways11, landing
approximately one foot from where he was standing when he struck
the automobile.

(Record at 287, 296, 310, 316-318, 345, 413-416)

A physical examination of the Trapp automobile revealed
no damage to the front grill, headlights, hood, or windshield.
The only physical evidence of the collision was a smudge of dirt
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off of the left side of the vehicle.

(Record at 269)

Experts

for both parties agreed at trial that Fisher collided with the
left side of the Trapp automobile near the front wheel area.
(Record at 345, 348, 413-416)
Pursuant to the trial court's order, no evidence of
Trapp's post-collision conduct was introduced at trial.
jury returned a verdict in favor of respondent Trapp.

The trial

Appellant's

motion for a new trial was denied, and appellant appeals.

(Record

at 242)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court did not commit reversible error in
either excluding evidence of respondent's post-collision conduct
or in limiting the testimony of appellant's expert, Val Shupe.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF RESPONDENT'S
POST-COLLISION CONDUCT.
A.

The Determination of Evidentiary Matters is Properly
Left to the Sound Discretion of the Trial Court.

Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence grants trial
courts considerable discretion in determining whether evidence,
although relevant, should be excluded on grounds of prejudice,
confusion, or waste of time. This court in Terry v. Zions Co-op
Merchantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), reaffirmed the
generally recognized principle that a reviewing court should
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generally defer to the trial court's determination of evidentiary
matters.
In Terry, the plaintiff customer brought a malicious prosecution, false arrest and false imprisonment action against the
defendant merchant arising from an alleged shoplifting incident.
At trial, the defendant wished to introduce evidence of the plaintiff's prior conviction and its surrounding facts as affecting the
issue of damages.

The trial court excluded the introduction of

the evidence, finding that the proffered evidence would have
misled and prejudiced the jury.
In holding that the trial judge committed no error in
balancing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect, the court stated, "When the trial judge weighs the
matter and makes the determination, his ruling should be looked
upon with indulgence and not disturbed unless it clearly appears
that he abused his discretion."

Id. at 323 (emphasis added).

The broad discretion granted to trial courts under the
Utah Rules of Evidence to determine the relevancy, materiality, or
prejudicial nature of evidence is shown in Reiser v. Lohner, 641
P.2d 93 (Utah 1982); and Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d
1139 (Utah 1977).
In Reiser, the plaintiff sought recovery for personal
injuries sustained as a result of the defendant doctor's alleged
negligent medical treatment.

The defendant doctor had failed to

perform two medical tests on the plaintiff's mother while plaintiff was in utero.

Plaintiff was born with severe brain damage
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and was later diagnosed as suffering from cerebral palsy and
spastic quadraplegia, all of which was indisputably not caused by
the defendant's failure to adminster the two medical procedures on
plaintiff's mother.

Prior to trial, defendant made a motion in

limine to exclude evidence that the medical procedures had not
been taken until just prior to the plaintiff's birth.

The trial

c<?urt granted the motion.
On appeal, this court refused to reverse the trial
court's evidentiary ruling, stating:
The trial judge was within the bounds of his
authority when he excluded the tests (or
lack of) pertaining to Rh sensitivity. It
is undisputed that Rh sensitivity was not
the cause of the child's injury, and any
evidence as to the diagnosis of such sensitivity therefore appears to be without
relevance. When this is coupled with the
potential prejudicial effect such evidence
might have upon the jury, the trial judge
was well within his discretion to exclude
it. Reiser, 641 P.2d at 97 (emphasis added)
In Martin, the plaintiff sought recovery for personal
injuries from a fall on a sidewalk leading from the defendant's
grocery store in Midvale.

The plaintiff sought to offer an

exhibit showing the weather conditions at the Salt Lake Airport at
the time of the accident.

The trial court sustained an objection

to the exhibit on the grounds that the exhibit was immaterial to
prove the weather conditions at the scene of the accident.
In sustaining the trial court's evidentiary ruling, this
court cited the predecessor to Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence
and stated:
The law is clear that in matters of
determining materiality the trial court
-6-

should be accorded a large measure of
discretion and should only be reversed if
this discretion is abused. The weather
report . . . had very little, if any, probative value and it could have created a
substantial risk of confusing the issues.
The judge did not abuse his discretion in
excluding it. Martin, 565 P.2d at 1141.
In view of the clear statements of this court in Terry,
Reiser, and Martin, and the underlying principle of Rule 403 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence, the balancing of probative value
against prejudicial effect must necessarily rest within the sound
discretion of the trial court.

Since this court has heretofore

granted broad discretion to the trial courts of this state in
making evidentiary rulings, the trial judge's exclusion of evidence of Trapp's post-collision conduct should not be disturbed
absent evidence of clear abuse of discretion or manifest error.
Brigham Young University v. Lillywhite, 118 F.2d 836 (10th Cir.
1941) , cert, denied 314 U.S. 638 (1941); State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d
1338 (Utah 1977), cert, denied 439 U.S. 882 (1978); and State v.
Gibson, 565 P.2d 783 (Utah 1977).
B.

The Prejudicial Effect of Evidence of
Respondent's Post-Collision Conduct
Substantially Outweighs the Probative Value
of Such Evidence in the Instant Action.

Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence sets forth the
applicable standard for the exclusion of relevant evidence on the
grounds of prejudice:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
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waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
This court in Terry v. Zions Co-op Mercantile Institution,
605 P.2d at 323, n. 31, stated:
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial . . .
if it has the tendency to influence the outcome of the trial by improper means, or if
it appeals to the jury's sympathies, or
arouses its sense of horror, provokes its
instincts to punish or otherwise causes a
jury to base its decision on something other
than the established proposition of the
case. (quoting Lease America Corp. v.
Insurance Co. of North America, 88 Wis.2d
395, 276 N.W.2d 767, 770 (1979)) .
The trial court in the instant case noted that evidence
of flight may be relevant under certain circumstances.
272)

(Record at

However, the court held that under the facts of this case,

the limited probative value of evidence of Trapp1s post-collision
conduct was outweighed by the tendency of the evidence to "inflame
the jury."

(Record at 272-273)

The tendency of evidence of post-

accident flight to unfairly prejudice jurys is well recognized:
[I]n many situations, the inference of
consciousness of guilt of the particular
crime is so uncertain and ambiguous and the
evidence so prejudicial that one is forced
to wonder whether the evidence is not
directed to punishing the "wicked11 generally
rather than resolving the issue of guilt of
the offense charged.
* * *

In addition, the potential for prejudice for flight evidence should be weighed
against is probative value. Critical scrutiny is called for in each particular case.
McCormick on Evidence §271 , (Lawyers 3d Ed.
1984) (emphasis added).
Appellant asserts that evidence of Trapp1s post-collision
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conduct raises several inferences, any of which would be helpful
to the jury in the determination of the instant action.

Although

the relevancy of a piece of evidence proffered is crucial, the
probative value of the evidence, standing alone, does not determine its admissibility.

Terry, 605 P.2d at 322.

The excluded

evidence in the instant case is, at best, only tangentially relevant, due its tendancy to allow the jury to speculate on facts
unsupported in the record.

The trial court did not err in prohi-

biting such potentially prejudicial evidence.

Other courts have

likewise noted that facts which support only conjectural inferences have little, if any, probative value.

Since facts sup-

porting only conjectural inferences have such limited probative
value, at least one jurisdiction has held them to be per se inadmissible.

Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727

F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1984), (applying Colorado law); and DoIan v.
Mitchell, 179 Colo. 359, 502 P.2d 72 (1972).
This court in Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489 (Utah
1985), recognized that trial courts have less discretion in
admitting evidence where the evidence is shown to support only
conjectural inferences which have little probative value, or where
there is no evidence that the fact has any causal connection with
the plaintiff1s injury, ^d. at 491-492.
The plaintiff in Pearce brought a wrongful death action
against the joint owners of a motor boat after his son drowned in
Utah Lake.

The plaintiff's teenage son went on a waterskiing trip

with several other teenagers on the afternoon of June 1, 1979.
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Plaintiff's son and several others had returned to their homes
early that morning from a high school graduation party in a nearby
canyon.

In the late afternoon, a brisk breeze came up, causing

the water to become choppy.

Despite the poor conditions, plain-

tiff's son entered the water to ski all the way back to the harbor.

As he waited in the water, the ski rope became entangled in

the propeller, stalling the engine.

Unable to dislodge the rope,

plaintiff's son struck out to swim for the west shore of the lake.
The boy never made it.
In a motion in limine heard before trial, counsel for
plaintiff requested the court to exclude any evidence that there
had been drinking at the canyon party the night before the accident.

The motion was made on the grounds that such evidence would

be irrelevant in establishing proximate cause, and that the prejudicial effect of such evidence would outweigh its probative value.
Counsel for defendant proffered evidence that plaintiff's son had
helped sponsor the party, had bought the liquor, and had very
little sleep before leaving the canyon at 6:00 a.m.

Counsel for

defendant further argued that the jurors should be allowed to draw
their own inferences from this evidence as to the deceased's prior
state of physical exhaustion.

Plaintiff's motion in limine to

exclude the evidence was denied.

The trial court entered a ver-

dict of no cause of action, and plaintiff appealed.
After noting the potential prejudicial effect of the
admitted evidence and the limited probative value such facts would
have in establishing the deceased's state of physical exhaustion,
this court remanded the case to the trial court and noted:
-10-

If evidence has some probative value, but
has a tendency to unduly prejudice or confuse the issues or to mislead the jury, the
trial court must balance the probative value
against those countervailing factors to
determine whether the evidence should be
admitted. "Precedent . . . is of little
value in reviewing such cases . . . . We
simply determine whether, on the facts of
the particular case, the trial court's
ruling was within the reasonable or permissible range.11 _Id. at 492-493 (quoting
Carlson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 57 Or.App.
695, 646 P.2d 43, 46-47 (1982)) (emphasis
added).
As illustrated by Pearce and Reiser, trial courts should
restrict the admissibility of potentially prejudicial evidence
that supports only conjectural inferences or which is undisputably
not a contributing factor to the accident.

See also Ratterree v.

Bartlett, 707 P.2d 1063 (Kan. 1985) (trial court excluded evidence
concerning the smell of alcohol on defendant's breath in a personal injury action arising out of an automobile accident.

Held:

Since the excluded evidence was not a contributing factor in the
accident, the trial court correctly ruled the evidence of the
smell of alcohol on defendant's breath would be more prejudicial
than probative).
Although appellant cites several cases which hold evidence of post-accident flight admissible under certain circumstances, other courts have held such evidence to be inadmissible.
See Freeman v. Anderson, 279 Ark. 282, 651 S.W.2d 450 (1983);
Spencer v. Adams, 37 Ga.Ct.App. 344, 140 S.E. 390 (1927); Clark v.
Mask, 232 Miss. 65, 98 So.2d 467 (1957); and Barnes v. Gaines, 668
P.2d 1175 (Okla.Ct.App. 1983).
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As this court stated in Pearce, case precedent is of
little value in reviewing a trial court's determination of
whether evidence is unfairly prejudicial.
492.

Pearce, 701 P.2d at

A trial court's ruling under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of

Evidence is most often a fact intensive decision that should not
be applied blindly to cases involving different facts and circumstances.

Flight from the scene of a tragedy may be quite as

consistent with innocence as with negligence.

One, who, despite

due care, kills or injures another, may through ignorance of the
law or through panic flee from the scene of his act, and yet be
perfectly innocent.

It would be a dangerous rule which would per-

mit the jury to consider flight as evidence of negligence in every
case.

See People v. Cismadija, 167 Mich. 210, 132 N.W. 489

(1911).

The equivocal nature of respondent's flight under the

circumstances of this case should be of particular concern to this
court.
The cases cited by appellant for the proposition that
evidence of post-accident flight is admissible are clearly
distinguishable on their facts.

First, the trial of the instant

action demonstrated that there is little, if any, dispute how the
accident occurred.

Trapp admitted that he did not see Fisher

until the moment of impact.

(Record at 285)

It was undisputed at

trial that the point of impact was on the side of the Trapp
vehicle.

(Record at 296, 310, 345, 369, 371, and 413-416)

The

only dispute in the instant action was on the part of the experts
on whether Trapp had sufficient time to see Fisher and to take
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evasive action to avoid the collision.

(Record at 334-338, and

390-392)
In Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. Snyder, 161 F.2d 323 (5th
Cir. 1947), cited by appellant, there were serious disputes on
whether the defendant was speeding prior to the moment of impact,
whether the defendant was on the wrong side of the road, whether
the plaintiff was on the wrong side of the road, and whether the
defendant had failed to dim his lights as required by state law.
Shaddy v. Daley, 58 Idaho 536, 76 P.2d 279 (1938), is similarly
distinguishable.

In Shaddy, there were a serious factual disputes

on whether the defendant's truck had its headlights lighted,
whether the defendant's truck struck the decedent on the highway,
and whether the defendant was speeding at the moment of impact.
Other cases cited by appellant involving serious factual disputes
include Harrington v. Sharff, 305 F.2d 333 (2nd Cir. 1962), and
State v. Ford, 109 Conn. 490, 146 A. 828 (1929).
Second, unlike the instant case, where eyewitnesses to
the accident were able to testify as to how the accident occurred,
several of the cases cited by appellant involve factual situations
where there were no eyewitnesses to the accident.

As a result, in

those cases there was little, if any, way to determine how the
accident occurred.

In the instant case, the jury was able to hear

testimony both from Fisher's brother, Patrick, and from Trapp on
how the accident occurred.
Since the trial jury in the instant case heard direct
testimony on the facts and circumstances of the accident, the jury
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did not need to consider the possible inferences that Fisher
attempted to raise through the introduction of evidence of Trapp1s
post-collision conduct.

Such conjectural inferences could have

confused the jury and distracted them from deciding the case on
the direct testimony of the two eyewitnesses to the accident.
Cases cited by appellant where no eyewitnesses were available to
testify how the accident occurred include:

Brooks v. E. J. Willig

Truck Transportation Co., 40 Cal.2d 669, 455 P.2d 802 (1953);
State v. Ford, 109 Conn. 490, 146 A. 828 (1929); Busbee v.
Quarrier, 172 So.2d 17 (Fla.Ct.App. 1965); Waycot v. Northeast
Ins. Co., 465 A.2d 854 (Maine 1983); Johnson v. Austin, 406 Mich.
420, 280 N.W.2d 9 (1979); and Jones v. Strelecki, 49 N.J. 513, 231
A.2d 558 (1967).
Third, several of the cases cited by appellant are
distinguishable from the instant case, since the evidence of
flight was admissible to impeach the credibility of defendants who
denied involvement in the accidents giving rise to those cases.
See Dean v. Cole, 217 F.Supp. 280 (E.D. S.C. 1963); Greenwood v.
Bailey, 184 So. 289 (Ala.Ct.App. 1938); Grzys v. Connecticut Co.,
123 Conn. 605, 198 A. 259 (1938); Busbee v. Quarrier, 172 So.2d 17
(Fla.Ct.App. 1965); and Vuillemot v. August J. Claverie & Co., 125
So. 168 (La. 1929).
In the instant case, respondent Trapp voluntarily
telephoned the police within 30 minutes of the accident to advise
them that he had been involved in the accident with appellant
Fisher.

Furthermore, at trial, Trapp unequivocally testified that
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he was the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident giving
rise to this case.

Under such circumstances, evidence of Trapp's

post-collision conduct has little, if any, probative value.
Fourth, as several of the cases cited by appellant
suggest evidence of post-accident flight may have probative value
where there is an allegation that the plaintiff is entitled to
punitive damages as a result of the defendant's gross negligence
or where the plaintiff's injuries were aggravated due to the
defendant's failure to stop and render assistance.

See Brooks v.

E. J. Willig Truck Transportation Co., 40 Cal.2d 669, 455 P.2d 802
(1953); Langenstein v. Reynaud, 13 La.App. 272, 127 So. 764
(1930); Richards v. Office Products Co., 55 Ohio App.2d 143, 380
N.E.2d 725 (1977); and Hallman v. Cushman, 196 S.C. 402, 13 S.E.2d
498 (1941).

These cases are clearly distinguishable from the

instant case, since Fisher's complaint against Trapp did not
allege that the accident was due to any gross negligence on the
part of Trapp nor does Fisher contend that his injuries were
aggravated due to Trapp's failure to immediately stop and render
aid at the accident scene.
Fifth, unlike in Johnson v. Austin, 406 Mich. 420, 280
N.W.2d 9 (1979), and Jones v. Strelecki, 49 N.J. 513, 231 A.2d
558 (1967), cited by appellant, the instant case does not involve
the special public policy concerns eminating from an unidentified
motorist act.

It is clear that the public policy considerations

underlying under such acts favor compensation.

Since the flight

of the unidentified motorist may result in the plaintiff losing
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the evidence necessary to establish his claim under such an act,
courts are more willing to allow inferences to be drawn from the
driver1s flight to allow injured parties to recover, who without
the inference would most likely be unable to recover.

The public

policy concerns present in Johnson and Jones are not present in
the instant case. Although some evidence has been lost due to
Fisher's inability to testify at trial, ample evidence on how the
accident occurred was presented at trial.
In sum, the cases cited by Fisher demonstrate the probative value of evidence of flight under certain limited circumstances:

1) where there are serious fact disputes surrounding the

accident; 2) where there are no eyewitnesses to the accident;
3) where the defendant denies involvement in the accident;
4) where the plaintiff's injuries are aggravated by the flight;
and 5) where special statutory based public policy concerns favor
a finding of negligence.

The instant action does not fall within

any of the above-cited categories.

Under the circumstances of

this case, the prejudicial effect of admitting evidence of Trapp's
post-collision conduct clearly outweighs the probative value of
such evidence.
POINT II.
EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING
EVIDENCE OF RESPONDENT'S POST-COLLISION
CONDUCT, SUCH ERROR WAS HARMLESS AND DOES
NOT WARRANT REMAND.
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that prejudicial error will not occur unless the excluded evidence affects
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a substantial right of the aggrieved party.

In determining

whether a substantial right of the appellant has been affected by
the exclusion of evidence of Trapp's post-collision conduct, this
court should consider the whole record.

This court should not

find an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court unless
this court, after reviewing the whole record, is left with a
definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred in its
ruling.

Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc. v. Stepanoff, 650 P.2d 375

(Alaska 1982).

The test for determining whether the alleged error

on the part of the trial court is prejudicial to the appellant is
whether, upon a review of the record, it sufficiently appears that
the rights of the appellant have been injuriously affected by the
error, or that he has suffered a miscarriage of justice.

See 5

Am.Jur.2d Appeal & Error §783 (1962).
In Gull Laboratories, Inc. v. Lewis A. Roser Co., 589
P.2d 756, 759 (Utah 1978), this court established that "a jury
verdict will only be upset where the error committed was so
substantial and prejudicial that there is a reasonable likelihood
that the result would have been different in the absence of such
error.11

Although appellant asserts that the exclusion of evidence

of Trapp's post-collision conduct affected his substantial rights,
the better-reasoned authorities find that the exclusion of evidence with only slight or conjectural value does not constitute
reversible error.

See 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal & Error §802 (1962).

As previously stated herein, the evidence of Trapp's
post-collision conduct supported only conjectural inferences of
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negligence.

Such inferences have little, if any, probative value.

See Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489 (Utah 1985); and DoIan v.
Mitchell, 179 Colo. 359, 502 P.2d 72 (Colo. 1972).

Since the

excluded evidence in the instant case had such little probative
value, it is impossible to conclude that there is u a reasonable
likelihood that the result would have been different" had such
evidence been admitted at trial. Absent such a showing, this
court should hold that the trial court's ruling did not result in
a miscarriage of justice or the denial of any substantial right of
the appellant.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN RELATION TO THE TESTIMONY OF
APPELLANT'S EXPERT, VAL SHUPE.
A.

The Determination of Matters of Foundation is
Properly Left to the Sound Discretion of the Trial
Court.

While the Utah Rules of Evidence permit opinion testimony
on an ultimate issue, it is clear that not all opinions are
admissible.

The opinion testimony of lay and expert witnesses

requires that the witness1 opinion have a basis in fact. This
court in Utah Dept. of Transportation v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031,
1036 (Utah 1984), stated:
Admission of any type of testimony requires
the laying of proper foundation to qualify
the witness to give the particular testimony
sought to be elicited. (Emphasis added).
Despite the liberality accorded to expert testimony under
the Utah Rules of Evidence, a foundation must still be laid for
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expert opinion testimony no matter what technique of presentation
is employed.

As a result, expert opinion testimony should be

excluded if its factual foundation is inadequate.

See 31

Am.Jur.2d Expert & Opinion Evidence §36 (1967); and 11 Moore's
Federal Practice §705.10, note 1 (1985).
This court in Day v. Lorenzo Smith & Son, Inc., 17 Utah
2d 221, 408 P.2d 186 (1965), recognized that a foundation must
still be laid for expert opinion testimony.

In Day, the plaintiff

brought action seeking recovery for personal injuries sustained in
an automobile collision. The crucial factual question was which
vehicle was in the wrong lane at the time of the accident.
Defendant called a Utah Highway Patrolman with 24 years experience
of accident investigation to testify as to the point of impact.
The investigating officer was at the scene investigating
another accident when the instant collision occurred.

However,

his back was to the highway and he did not see the actual impact.
The officer did observe the movements of the vehicles immediately
afterwards.

The officer also examined and measured the skid marks

and debris left by the vehicles following their collision.

The

officer's qualification as an expert in accident investigations
was not challenged at trial. However, when the defendant
attempted to elicit the officer's opinion as to the point of
impact, the plaintiff objected on the grounds of lack of foundation.

The objection was overruled and the officer was allowed

to give his opinion as to the point of the impact.
On appeal, this court held the trial court's admission of
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the officer's testimony to be prejudicial error.

In reaching that

decision, the court stated:
[W]e believe the proper rule to be that a
trial judge, in his discretion, may permit a
qualified expert (in this case an
experienced Highway Patrolman) to give his
opinion as to the point of collision when a
proper foundation for the opinion has been
laid.
ic

ic

ic

[W]e hold that it was error to permit
[the Highway Patrolman's] testimony as to
the point of impact because his opinion was
not supported by sufficient facts and, what
meager facts he did testify to were not connected up or related to his opinion. They
were inadequate to support his conclusion.
Day, 408 P.2d at 187, 189. (Emphasis in
original).
Similarly, in Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah
1979), this court held that an adequate foundation must be laid
before an expert's opinion is admitted into evidence.

The action

in Edwards arose out of a two-car automobile collision.

At trial,

the plaintiff presented the testimony of the investigating
officer.

The officer testified to his expertise in accident

investigation and to what he saw and did in the course of his
investigation.

He testified to the length and location of skid

marks, the speed of the automobiles, the point of impact, and
various other facts and inferences. At the conclusion of the
officer's direct examination, the following took place:
Q [By plaintiff's attorney] . . .
From the information that you have, your
independent investigation, talking with the
witnesses, observing the situation, have you
reached an opinion, have you formed an opinion as to what the cause of this accident
was?
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A

Yes.

Q

And would you give us that opinion?

A Mr. Christian:
your honor.
The Court:

I object to that,

Sustained.

Id.

at 1329.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the officer's
opinion had been erroneously excluded by the trial court.

In

sustaining the lower court's exclusion of the expert's opinion,
this court noted the requirement that adequate foundation be laid
before an expert's opinion is admitted into evidence:
The admissibility of accident reconstruction
evidence depends in large measure upon the
foundation laid. The expertise of the witness, his degree of familiarity with the
necessary facts, and the logical nexus
between his opinion and the facts adduced
must be established. When such a foundation
is laid, Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence [predecessor to the current Rule
703] makes an expert's opinion admissible,
even though it embraces an ultimate issue,
^d. at 1331.
See also Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 644-645 (Utah 1980)
(courts should establish whether sufficient foundation has been
laid for an expert to render expert opinion testimony).
Other courts have likewise held that an expert's opinion
must be based upon sufficient foundation in order to be
admissible.

In Kingsbury v. Hickey, 56 Or.App. 492, 642 P.2d 339

(1982), the plaintiff's accident reconstruction expert testified
that he had examined one of the damaged vehicles, visited the
scene of the accident, took measurements of the damage sustained
by one of the vehicles, and examined undamaged vehicles similar to
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those involved in the accident.

The witness1 qualifications as an

expert in mechanical engineering were not challenged.

The trial

court, upon appropriate objection by the defendant, excluded the
expertfs opinion as to the speed of the vehicles and the point of
impact.
In affirming the trial court's exclusion of the evidence
offered by the expert accident reconstructionist, the Oregon Court
of Appeals noted:
An expert's opinion is admissible only if
based on facts in evidence or on facts
within the personal knowledge of the expert.
Expert evidence offered with sufficient
foundation is too speculative and therefore
not admissible.
•k

*

"k

The burden of proving a proper foundation for an expert opinion is on the proponent of the evidence . . . . When the
factual foundation is lacking or unreliable,
the evidence should be excluded. The trial
judge was entitled to conclude that the witness' estimate of the speed of the vehicles
upon which his evidence on their point of
impact depended lacked a reliable factual
foundation and was speculative. Kingsbury,
642 P.2d at 341-342 (citations omitted).
As with other evidentiary matters, the determination of
adequate foundation is solely within the discretion of the trial
court.

Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438 (Utah 1979).

In citing the

general rule of deference to be accorded to trial court decisions
on evidentiary matters, this court in Terry v. Zions Co-op
Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314, 322-323 (Utah 1979), stated:
It is generally conceded the trial court is
more competent, in the exercise of this
discretion, to judge the exigencies of a
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particular case and, therefore, when exercised within normal limits, the discretion
should not be disturbed. The general rule
followed by this court is the judgment of
the trial court will not be reversed unless
it is shown that the discretion exercised
therein has been abused.
In sum, this court should be reluctant to interfere with the lower
court1s ruling in the instant matter unless there is evidence that
the trial court's discretion has been manifestly abused to the
prejudice of the complaining party.
B.

Appellant Initially Failed to Lay Adequate
Foundation at Trial for the Opinion of His Expert.

On the first day of trial appellant called and certified
Val Shupe as an accident reconstruction expert.
320-321)
tions.

(Record at

No objection was raised as to Mr. Shupe1s qualifica-

Shupe also testified about the examinations and calcula-

tions which he made in preparation for his testimony at trial.
(Record at 322-327)

When Fisher attempted to elicit Shupe1s

opinion as to the cause of the accident, respondent timely
objected on the grounds of lack of foundation for said opinion.
Out of the hearing of the jury, Shupe offered the following
opinion:
Q (By Mr. Hansen) What's the cause of
the accident in your opinion, Mr. Shupe?
A My opinion, my opinion as far as
what the cause of the accident, the speed
was too fast for the conditions surrounding
it.
Q

Any other cause?

A Yes, sir. I feel he was not totally
aware of what -- of the circumstances in
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front of him for the distance that he was
away from the pedestrian. (Record at 334)
The trial court then carefully examined the factual
underpinnings of Mr. Shupefs opinion, and concluded that there was
insufficient foundation for Mr. Shupe to base that opinion.
(Record at 328-334)

Although, the court excluded Shupe1s opinion

as to the cause of the accident, the court allowed Shupe to
testify on how far back Trapp was from the point of impact when
Fisher began crossing the road.

(Record at 338-339)

In excluding Shupe1s opinion as to the cause of the accident, the trial court correctly determined that Shupe's opinion
was not sufficiently grounded in the relevant facts of the case.
Under Rule 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the trial court has
discretion in requiring the prior disclosure of the facts or data
which underly an expert's opinion testimony.
During the proffer of testimony outside of the juryfs
presence, it was clear that counsel for appellant had not
established sufficient foundation for the admission of his
expert's opinion.

Notwithstanding appellant's presentation of

evidence on where Trapp was when appellant entered the roadway,
appellant failed to ask the essential foundational question, the
answer to which might have resulted in Shupe's opinion being
admitted, "Where was Trapp when he could have perceived Fisher and
taken evasive action?"

Until such a question was asked and

answered, there was no foundation for any testimony regarding
Trapp's alleged negligence in failing to perceive Fisher in the
roadway and in failing to take appropriate evasive action.
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Fisher

was further unable to point to any physical evidence (e.g., skid
marks) as to Trapp's actual perception of Fisher in the highway.
Physical evidence was lacking on several other key factors, such
as the location of other cars which might have obstructed Trapp's
opportunity to perceive Fisher in the roadway and the angle of the
headlight beam of Trapp's vehicle.

Without taking such factors

into consideration, the trial court correctly ruled that Fisher
failed to lay adequate foundation for Shupe's opinion.
It is important to note that the essence of Shupe's
opinion, i.e., the few factual bases upon which the opinion was
based, was presented to the jury.

Mr. Shupe's testimony was

excluded only to preclude the drawing of a conclusion from the
admitted evidence.

The following testimony by Mr. Shupe

demonstrates that the essence of his excluded opinion was before
the jury:
Q (By Mr. Hansen) Before we recess,
I'm not sure that you gave us the manner in
which you computed how long it would take
this young boy to run out to the point of
impact. Did you do that?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

And that time was what, around?

A From the time for him to run into
the road?
Q

Yes.

A

Approximately 2.5 seconds.

Q Now, assuming that that's how long
it took? Then can you calculate from that
how far back the Trapp vehicle, the defendant's car was at the time the boy started
to run?
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A Yes. Traveling at 40 miles per
hour, he would be traveling at 58.68 feet
per second. That would place him back
approximately 146 feet from the point of
impact at the time the boy started to run
into the road.
Q Now, is there any way from those
calculations to determine whether or not he,
in fact, saw the boy when he first started
out; that is, started across.
A Well, he would have to have, as we
talked about, he would have to have perception and a reaction, and that perception and
reaction would take up so many feet. And in
this particular case, it would take up 86
feet. But there was no evidence that I
found or anything through investigation to
indicate that he made any evasive action
whatsoever. And also from reading from his
deposition, he never saw the boy until the
boy hit the car, struck the car, indicating
he made no evasive action whatsoever.
(Record at 338-339)
C.

Any Error Which Might Have Been Committed by
the Trial Court's Exclusion of Shupe's
Opinion was Cured by the Subsequent Admission
of the Very Same Opinion During Later
Testimony.

On the second day of trial, Fisher called his expert
accident reconstructionist back to the stand to testify.

Shupe

testified that following his initial testimony in the matter, he
had acquired additional information with respect to the accident.
He testified that he had returned to the scene of the accident
with appellant and appellant's family to get additional information as to the position of Trapp's vehicle at the time Fisher
entered the road.

Shupe then opined that Trapp was 201 feet away

from the point of impact when Fisher entered the road.
then reveals:
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The record

Q Based on that new information and
based on all the depositions and interrogatories that you read and your investigation
of this accident, do you have an opinion as
to the cause of this accident?
A

Yes, sir, I do.

Q

And what is that opinion?

A My opinion is that the gentleman was
proceeding too fast for the conditions and
that he had improper lookout of the
situation^
(Record at 427) (Emphasis added)
Courts have consistently held that the improper exclusion
of competent testimony constitutes harmless error where essentially the same evidence is established later by the same witness,
other witnesses, or by other means.

See P. A. Sorensen Co. v.

Denver & Rio Grand Railroad Co., 49 Utah 548, 164 P. 1020 (1917);
Millsap v. Williamson, 294 Ala. 634, 320 So.2d 649 (1975);
Bailey v. Leonard, 625 P.2d 849 (Alaska 1981); State v. Caldwell,
117 Ariz. 464, 573 P.2d 864 (1977); In Re Ching's Estate, 46
Hawaii 127, 376 P.2d 125 (1962); and Duran v. Mueller, 79 Nev.
453, 386 P.2d 733 (Nev. 1963).
Careful scrutiny of the entire record in this case reveals
that the subsequent testimony by appellant's expert, Val Shupe, was
as broad and comprehensive as that initially excluded by the trial
court.

Furthermore, the essence of Shupefs opinion was never

excluded at any time from the jury.

The jury was equally competent

to draw the desired inferences and conclusions from the underlying
facts which were admitted into evidence without objection.

Since

the underlying facts were presented to the jury and the subsequent
questioning of Shupe gave testimony which had the effect of
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answering the question to which the previous objection had been
sustained, any error committed by the trial court in limiting the
testimony of Val Shupe was harmless error.
CONCLUSION
There is no dispute in this case that Trapp's postcollision conduct did not contribute to Fisher's injuries. At
most, the excluded evidence was to create an inference of negligence on the part of Trapp.

In excluding evidence with little, if

any, probative value, the trial court did not abuse the broad
discretion given to it under the Utah Rules of Evidence. As a
result, the trial court's ruling on the exclusion of such evidence
cannot be said to have affected any substantial right of the
appellant.
Similarly, the trial court's action in requiring Fisher
to lay sufficient foundation before admitting the opinion of his
expert as to the cause of the accident in question is clearly
recognized and permitted under the Utah Rules of Evidence. The
trial court was correct in finding that the appellant had not met
its burden of proving a proper foundation for the opinion which it
attempted to elicit from its expert. Assuming arguendo that the
trial court erred in its ruling in relation to the testimony of
Val Shupe, it is clear that the initial exclusion of the expert's
ultimate conclusion was rendered harmless since the essence of Mr.
Shupe's conclusion was allowed into evidence and Shupe's conclusion was later admitted into evidence, without objection.
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Therefore, respondent respectfully requests that this
court affirm the evidentiary rulings of the trial court in this
matter,

A
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3

day of

, 1986.
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APPENDIX A
RULE 103
RULINGS ON EVIDENCE
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of party is affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one
admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to
strike appears of record, stating the specific
ground of objection, if the specific ground was not
apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence
was made known to the court by offer or was
apparent from the context within which questions
were asked.
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any
other or further statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made, and
the ruling thereon. It may direct the making of an offer in
question and answer form.
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall
be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means,
such as making statements or offers of proof or asking questions
in the hearing of the jury.
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they
were not brought to the attention of the court.
RULE 401
DEFINITION OF "RELEVANT EVIDENCE"
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.
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RULE 402
RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY
ADMISSIBLE: IRRELEVANT
EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of the State of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or
by other rules applicable in courts of this State. Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible.
RULE 403
EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT
EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
RULE 705
DISCLOSURE OF FACTS OR
DATA UNDERLYING EXPERT OPINION
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference
and give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the
underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise.
The expert may in any event be required to disclose the
underlying facts or date on cross-examination.
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